DURING the Remembrance Day commemorations on the Falklands recently, armed forces minister Luke Pollard reaffirmed the nation’s commitment to the defence and security of the islands.
In doing so, he echoed assurances made by Sir Keir Starmer in October that British sovereignty of the South Atlantic overseas territories was non-negotiable. Under his watch, the PM said, the UK would be prepared to defend the islands at any cost.
Given that the Labour Government had recently surrendered sovereignty of the Chagos Islands, it was an important message.
In Argentina, the rhetoric remains equally robust.
When a civil servant in the Ministry of Defence in Buenos Aires used the term ‘Falklands’ instead of the Argentine denomination of ‘Malvinas’ in an official government release, defence minister Luis Petri raged ‘we want to fire the bastard who committed this malicious act’.
The purchase of 24 refurbished F-16 fighter jets this year from Denmark, along with Sidewinder and AMRAAM missiles, will eventually give Buenos Aires the ability to once more launch direct air strikes on the islands.
It is just one of the many ways in which Argentina seems to be slowly working to modernise its military.
But how likely is the resurgence of military conflict between both countries over this disputed territory in the South Atlantic?
The 74-day-long Falklands War of 1982 saw the UK successfully retake the islands after an Argentine invasion at a total cost of 900 deaths , of which 265 were British .
Since then, however, no other military confrontation has ensued between the two nations.
Yet, the Argentine constitutional mission to gain control of these islands, alongside the neighbouring Sandwich and the South Georgia islands, remains a ‘non-renounceable goal of the Argentine people.’
Argentina claims sovereignty over the islands due to its shared colonial history with Spain, certain rights enshrined within international law, and the islands’ geographical proximity to Argentine territory.
The UK claims to be the first nation to have inhabited the islands in 1690, after which it formally established a settlement in 1766. Together with the Sandwich and South Georgia islands, they comprise around 1.2 million square miles of exclusive economic area in a region rich in resources.
Strategically speaking, the Falklands form part of a wider geopolitical project and an extension of the UK’s traditional strategic identity as a sea power.
They are also a vital plank in the UK’s strategic positioning in the South Atlantic for both commerce and defence, and enable the UK to claim territory in the Antarctic.
Yet despite this, foreign office officials have admitted that self-determination remains the key to Britain’s continuing claim, suggesting that the UK would give them up if the islanders chose to be identified as Argentine.
This was put to the test in 2013 when an overwhelming majority (99.8 per cent) of Falkland citizens voted to remain British in a referendum, which Argentina has publicly dismissed.
For the British, the Falklands is more than a game of chess. There is a moral imperative underwritten by the Falklanders’ own desires – Starmer is duty-bound to protect these people because they want to continue to be British.
The President of Argentina, Javier Milei, has conceded that the Falklands are currently ‘in the hands of’ the British and that Argentina is not seeking conflict with Britain.
However, in May, Milei emphasised that Argentina would never stop seeking to establish its sovereignty over the islands, adding that this will be a long process which should take the form of peaceful diplomatic negotiations, rather than violent conflict.
Crucially, Milei has explicitly stated that gaining control of the islands is not within his government’s priorities, and will remain a secondary, long-term goal of Argentina, a task that will likely outlive the duration of his presidential term.
With a poverty rate now reaching almost 53 per cent, and a monthly inflation rate of around 2.7 per cent in October (the best in years), Argentina is focusing – and rightly so – on improving its economic situation.
Milei simply cannot match Britain’s economic commitment to the islands, which runs at around £60m every year, let alone afford a another invasion and the costly business of administering the islands in the event that it was successful.
Even Britain has publicly stated that the sale of the US-made F-16s -which were green-lit by Washington DC as a way to help one of the US’ few right of centre allies in South America – is no indication that Argentina’s military will be getting significantly stronger any time soon.
In the foreseeable future, we can expect Argentina to continue to defend its sovereignty claim over the Falklands.
This will likely translate into a long-term strategy, seeking to establish constructive dialogue with Britain, rather than escalating security tensions.
Milei will prioritise commercial relations, attracting foreign investment, and reducing inflation rates that plague the Argentine economy.
In that way, the Falklands dispute seems destined to remain a battle of rhetoric for the foreseeable future.
